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Abstract 
The so-called Exclusion argument (Kim 2000; Papineau 2004) about mental 
causation applies one premise that is typically accepted without much discussion: the 
thesis of causal completeness of the physical domain (CCP). In part one I evaluate 
Papineau’s (2001) argument for the CCP. I argue that this argument is not satisfying 
and that it is incomplete. The rest of the thesis is dedicated to an alternative to 
physicalism, namely ontological pluralism. Part two covers parts of Nancy 
Cartwright’s work (1983; 1999; 2007; forthcoming) and I account for her pluralism in 
causation. In part three I present and discuss metaphysical pluralism as argued for by 
John Dupré (1995). In the final section, I balance pluralism against physicalism. On 
the basis of that discussion I end with outlining an argument for ontological 
pluralism. My overall goal is mainly two things. I aim to show (i) that physicalism is 
not the only serious alternative to dualism, and (ii) that it is feasible to regard 
ontological pluralism, which I consider a type of philosophical materialism, as ‘the 
scientific metaphysics’. 
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Introduction 
 
The overall problem at hand is how to understand the mind and its place in the natural 
world. My motivation for taking this problem serious is an aspiration for making 
sense of humans as autonomous and rational agents, and of understanding and 
explaining subjectivity, experientiality, morality, rationality, intentionality and 
content (linguistic meaning; semantic) in the natural world. In the literature one will 
see that in providing an answer to this we might form a theory about the mind (e.g. 
dualism, functionalism or identity theory). We could, however, flip the coin and ask 
into what we are trying to fit the mind; what is the ontological nature of the world of 
which we have a hard time finding room for the mind to act in? This thesis starts off 
by sketching out the problem of mental causation. Part one concerns an argument for 
the doctrine of causal completeness of the physical domain. Part two and three 
explore an often-ignored alternative to physicalism, namely ontological pluralism. 
My aim, in general, is to show that physicalism is not the only serious alternative to 
dualism. Moreover, I hope to say something about how philosophers conduct 
metaphysics.  
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1. Mental Causation and Physicalism 
1.1 The Problem of Mental Causation 
 
How, if at all, can we understand that mental properties – such as people holding 
beliefs and having desires – can be causally relevant in the production of bodily 
behaviour? We need to distinguish between two different interpretations of the phrase 
‘bodily behaviour’ in this statement. With the first understanding we ask whether 
(and how) mental properties can cause ‘actions’; and with the second interpretation 
our question is whether (and how) mental properties can cause ‘physiological 
movements’. By ‘physiological movements’ I mean certain specific changes in the 
natural world. The natural world is what is subject to the natural sciences such as 
physics, biology and chemistry (among others). The reason for this distinction is that 
one might argue that mental properties are causally relevant in the production of 
actions, but at the same time deny that mental properties are in any way relevant in 
the production of physiological movements, i.e., it is not until we characterise a piece 
of bodily movement as an action that we need to bring in mental properties; and when 
we do so (refer to bodily movement as an action, that is) certain mental properties are 
necessary in order to make the action intelligible. It should be noted, however, that 
within this conception of the problem one is still left with how to explain the relation 
between mental properties and the physical world in which they bring about changes 
– the physical changes constituting the particular actions. That is to say, even when 
characterising a piece of bodily behaviour as an action we have a problem of 
explaining the relation between the mental properties (a person’s desires and beliefs) 
and the physical changes it produces, whether it is an arm’s movement when 
throwing a rock, the rock flying through the air, or the shattering of the window. This 
fundamental problem – how beliefs and desires are causally related to the movement 
of matter – is there to be dealt with within both conceptions of the problem; it just 
looks slightly different by interpreting ‘bodily behaviour’ as an action. This reading 
of the problem of mental causation is not what I have in mind in this discussion, 
however. I approach this issue by understanding our present concern the following 
way: how can we understand that mental properties can be causally efficacious with 
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respect to changes in the natural world? Put more differently, it is the problem of 
whether higher-level properties can cause changes at a lower level (often called 
‘downward causation’) that interest me.1  
 
1.2 Where we’re at 
 
The dominating stance on this matter among contemporary philosophers is some sort 
of ‘physicalism’. Physicalism, in general, can be understood as the doctrine stating 
that everything that exists either is physical, or supervenes on the physical. In 
discussions about supervenience it is common to speak in terms of realization, 
whereby a set of physical properties, P, realize another set of properties, M, just in 
case the instantiation of (the properties in) P is sufficient for the instantiation of (the 
properties in) M. Such a criterion leaves room for the multiple realizability-thesis, 
which says that different (kinds of) physical systems are capable of realizing one and 
the same (kind of) property. This has lead many defenders of the thesis to the 
conclusion that the supervenient properties cannot be understood as reducible (hence 
non-reductive physicalism). See for example John Bickle’s online article Multiple 
Realizability (2008) for a thorough discussion. 
 
There are several arguments in favour of physicalism, but the most powerful one is 
probably the so-called Exclusion argument (Kim 2000), also known as the Causal 
argument (Papineau 2004), which applies the problem of higher-level, or downward 
causation. Three key premises constitute the argument. The first states that mental 
properties are causally efficacious (the causal efficaciousness of the mental, or CEM 
for short); the second claim is that the physical domain is causally self-sufficient, 
complete or closed (the causal completeness of physics, or CCP for short); and finally 
the premise that effects are not systematically overdetermined by distinct causes (no 
                                            
1 One way of understanding this problem may involve issues from mereology. In that case the problem may be 
stated as the following: regarding a compound object, are there properties appearing at a higher level of 
investigation responsible for the behaviour of its component parts? 
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overdetermination, or NOD for short). A reductive account of the mental is taken to 
follow. From here onwards I will refer to this argument as the Causal Exclusion 
argument. 
 
If we want to escape the conclusion we need to deny (at least) one of the premises. A 
denial of the first premise (CEM) results in an endorsement of epiphenomenalism. 
The insistent worries that the epiphenomenalist needs to account for are how we are 
able to report – and acquire knowledge about – mental states (e.g., that I am in pain, 
that I am consciously aware of x, that I believe that φ, that I intend to ψ, and so on). 
The third premise (NOD) is an intricate issue and I will only say a few things to 
indicate how it is possible to respond to this.  
 
When we are trying to explain what overdetermination amounts to we usually 
illuminate the issue by appeal to examples more familiar, or commonsensical to us: a 
house fire is caused by both a short circuit and a bolt lightning; two bullets are fired 
and hit the heart simultaneously causing the death of a poor victim. The effect, E 
(e.g., the house fire or the death of our victim), it is commonly said, is 
overdetermined by two distinct causes, A (e.g., a short circuit or one of the shots) and 
B (e.g., the bolt lightning or the second shot), if both A and B separately are sufficient 
for the bringing about of E. Two criterions of overdetermination may thereby be 
stated as follows: E is overdetermined by A and B if (i) A had happened without B, E 
would occur, and if (ii) B had happened without A, E would occur. (See: Bennett 
2004, p. 8) The difficulty with these examples, and why they only can serve as a 
useful analogy to illustrate the issue in question, is that the two causes that 
overdetermine the effect are separate and independent of each other, i.e., they are not 
connected or related in the same way that most philosophers think that the physical 
and mental properties in question are (that is, by supervenience). This point is heavily 
discussed in the literature.2 One possible way of responding to the worry about 
                                            
2 See e.g. Lowe (2003), Melnyk (2003), Menzies (2003), and also Bennett (2003) for discussions concerning 
mental/physical overdetermination.  
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overdetermination is to question if overdetermination really is such a rare phenomena 
as we take it to be. Ted Sider (2003) asks us to consider some examples that – if we 
accept them – will show that overdetermination is, as a matter of fact, a widespread 
phenomenon. His examples are these: an effect, E, is overdetermined by some micro-
objects and a macro-object composed of those objects; E is overdetermined by some 
micro-events and a macro-event composed of those events; E is overdetermined by an 
object and an event involving that object; E is overdetermined by an object and a fact 
involving that object; and finally, E is overdetermined by a fact and a corresponding 
event. (Sider 2003, p. 1) The question, if we accept these cases, is then this: is 
mental/physical overdetermination as acceptable? I do not wish to elaborate any 
further on this; what I have said indicates one possible way to respond to the 
seemingly unsolvable problem of mental causation. Let me instead turn to my main 
subject of concern, the second premise in the Causal Exclusion argument.  
 
The premise stating the CCP in the argument is typically accepted without much 
discussion. The thesis that the physical domain is causally self-sufficient, complete or 
closed is widely viewed as a firm and undisputable cornerstone in contemporary 
discussions about mind and physicalism. I want to direct my discussion towards this 
premise and question the thesis itself. I want to evaluate this principle, and will do so 
through three different (though related) discussions. First I will evaluate Papineau’s 
arguments (2001); second I will present Cartwright’s ontology and her argument 
against the CCP; and finally I will look at the pluralistic ontology presented by John 
Dupré (1995). I believe that my considerations of the above-mentioned will show that 
physicalism, maintained on the basis of CCP, is not the only game in town, and what 
is more, what is often considered to be the reasons to believe in physicalism are in 
fact not well supported by contemporary science; the assumptions underlying 
arguments for physicalism are, in fact, at odds with what science tells us about nature.  
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1.3 Varieties of the CCP 
 
There is a large number of different formulations out there of how to understand the 
CCP. Different formulations yield different understandings; and different 
understandings may lead to different discussions. Despite the different formulations 
that appear in the literature there are two main varieties of which we need to be clear. 
We have to discern between the weaker and stronger notion of the principle. As a first 
approximation we can understand the weaker reading of the principle – let us call this 
completeness – to say that all physical events have complete physical causal stories. 
This should not be confused with the stronger claim that nothing non-physical can 
(causally) interact with the physical realm. This is what I will refer to as ‘closure’. In 
short, what is at stake here is whether or not there is room for overdetermination. Let 
me render two formulations appearing in the literature. Papineau (2004, p. 17) defines 
what he calls ‘completeness’ as follows:  
 
(CCP) “All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories.” 
(Italics edited by author.)   
 
Cartwright (forthcoming, p. 1) puts what she calls ‘closure’ this way:  
 
(CCP*) “Are there (in God’s great Book of Nature) laws of physics that dictate 
everything that happens in the natural world? Or, more narrowly, everything that 
happens in the physical world?” 
 
It appears to me that they should switch labels on their definitions. The crucial 
elements in Papineau’s formulation are the phrases “fully caused by” and “purely”. 
This formulation makes no claim on how to understand causation, i.e., it is neutral 
with respect to the question whether causation is deterministic or probabilistic. It does 
not include the claim that physical effects have a sufficient cause, and it does not rule 
out the possibility of an effect being overdetermined by multiple physical causes. But 
what this formulation must be taken to rule out is the possibility of an effect being 
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overdetermined by two distinct causes, one of which is physical and the other mental. 
In other words, this seems to be the stronger formulation of causal closure rather than 
completeness. Cartwright’s definition, on the other hand, says nothing which would 
rule out the possibility for overdetermination. If there exists physical laws that 
“dictate everything that happens in the natural world” (italics added by author), it 
could still be the case that there was a simultaneous non-physical cause for the 
physical effect in question. Therefore, it seems like Cartwright’s definition would 
most properly be labeled ‘completeness’ rather than ‘closure’. Although she uses the 
notion of ‘dictate’, which indeed is a bold causal concept (because, unlike 
Papineau’s, it seems to suggest causal determinism and sufficiency), it appears to me 
that this notion does not rule out overdetermination. If a physical effect, E, at time t1 
has a sufficient physical cause, A, at time t0, it could still be the case that the physical 
effect E (at time t1) has a non-physical cause, B, at time t0 distinct from the relevant 
physical cause, A. The sufficient physical cause (A) could still be said to ‘dictate’ its 
effect.3  
 
For a more precise and unmistakable understanding of the difference between weak 
and strong CCP, let me reiterate Montero’s (2003, pp. 174-175) definitions. 
 
(Completeness) “Every physical phenomenon that has a sufficient cause has a 
sufficient physical cause.”4 
 
                                            
3 One might object that it is not clear whether or not the notion of ‘dictate’ should be understood this way. It is 
not important to me, however, to settle on either one or the other interpretations of Cartwright’s formulation. 
My point, rather, is that we should be clear and precise in our definition when discussing this issue. Cf. 
Papineau’s formulation: what he labels ‘completeness’ is in fact a stronger principle, i.e., it rules out 
physical/mental overdetermination, and this cannot be established only on the basis of showing that physical 
effects have complete physical histories. 
4 There are two things to say about this definition. First, the principle as defined by Panineau (see above) seems 
to be too strong: we do not want it to rule out the possibility that there are (physical) phenomena without a 
cause (e.g., it is not clear whether or not the big bang, which seems to be physical, had a cause). (Montero 
2003, p. 174) And second, it is suggested that quantum mechanics provides us with reasons to doubt the CCP. 
The solution to this objection is to interpret ‘sufficient cause’ as a cause that either fully determines its effects 
or fully determines the chances of its possible effects. (Papineau 2004, p. 17)   
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(Closure) “Physical effects have only physical causes.” 
 
Note that if one chooses to adopt the stronger thesis of closure the Causal Exclusion 
argument would be simplified to consist of only two premises.  
 
1. (CEM) Mental properties cause physical effects. 
2. (Closure) Physical effects have only physical causes. 
Thus: Mental causes are physical causes. 
 
In the following it is the weaker definition of the CCP that is of my concern – the 
causal completeness of physics. In other words, it is arguments for the statement that 
every physical phenomenon (that has a sufficient cause) has a sufficient physical 
cause that will be treated here. In what follows it is this I have in mind when I write 
‘CCP’.5 
 
1.4 What is ‘Physics’? 
 
Before I can move on to the discussion of the CCP-thesis I will have to address a 
terminological issue. It is not obvious how we are to understand ‘physics’ when 
discussing the Causal Exclusion argument. The question can be straightforwardly 
stated as follows: what should count as something physical? In answering this 
question we would, presumably, say something about the very nature of the things 
that make up the possible self-sufficient domain. One worry, if we operate with an 
                                            
5 See also Eric Marcus’ paper Mental Causation in a Physical World (2005) for an interesting discussion of the 
relation between the weaker and stronger readings of the CCP, and how to respond to Causal Exclusion 
argument. Noteworthy is the fact that he does not question the validity of the completeness-thesis. His point is 
that the veridicality of mental causation is not ruled out by the completeness-thesis. You can accept the causal 
completeness of the physical and at the same time have mental causation. “Tracing the causal ancestry of a 
physical event need not take us outside the physical domain; but it might if we let it.” (Marcus 2005, p. 33) In 
his conclusion, however, Marcus makes it perfectly clear that he has not shown how mental properties are, or 
can be, causally relevant in the production of bodily movement. I.e., how mental properties can make a 
difference in what happens in the physical world. What he has shown is that even a robust physicalistic 
metaphysic, namely causal completeness of the physical domain together with mind-body supervenience, poses 
no threat to mental causation. (Marcus 2005, p. 45) Or so he argues. 
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unstinting conception, is that the CCP-thesis comes out as trivially true. In other 
words, we need to tighten our conception of ‘physics’, but by how much? Due to the 
persistent progression in science it would be unwise to limit the term ‘physical’ only 
to the entities and properties existing in present physics. New concepts will without a 
doubt emerge in future science, so if we tie the meaning of ‘physics’ to present day 
physical entities (fundamental particles, properties, laws, forces and so on), the thesis 
is most likely to come out plain false. So the appropriate formulation of what physical 
properties and entities are, would be something like the following: the properties and 
entities postulated by the ultimately true theory of physics. There is a problem of 
understanding this because of our ignorance of what entities and properties this 
ultimate true theory of physics will eventually include. Many (e.g., Spurrett & 
Papineau 1999, among others) seems to think that as a result what is more important 
is to find out what ‘physics’ does not include; what should count as non-physical? It 
is common to simply assume that the concepts of tomorrow’s physics do not include 
mental properties (and/or entities) or any other ‘dubious’ properties (and/or entities). 
Following that line of thought, a definition of what something physical is would be to 
simply call it ‘non-dubious’. I am sceptical to this broad conception of physics, but 
the reason I take note of this is that I want to account for a point Vicente (2006, p. 
150) makes. “[T]he mind has classically been the focus of the present argument [the 
Causal Exclusion argument], but the argument can be ‘exported’ to any dubious 
domain, as long as the instantiation of dubious properties seem to bring about 
physical effects.” I reckon this to be an important point. This will be elaborated on 
and clarified in the next section. But first, it is time to turn to the arguments for the 
CCP.  
 
1.5 Arguments for the CCP 
 
Papineau (2001; 2004) presents an argument (or rather two intertwined arguments) 
that, according to him, illustrates that there is “little room for doubt about the doctrine 
[the CCP]” (2004, p. 255). The arguments (Papineau 2001, pp. 27-30) are these:  
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The Argument from Fundamental Forces. The argument assumes that every prima 
facie special force reduces to a limited set of basic physical forces, which conserves 
energy. Although this is no knock-down argument (because it is consistent with the 
existence of special forces as long as they themselves are conservative, though “there 
are no obvious grounds for expecting such sui generis special forces to be 
conservative” [Papineau 2001, p. 28]), there is inductive reasons for believing in the 
CCP: the increasing capacity of physics to explain phenomena by means of this 
limited set of forces. This argument finds its evidence in yet another argument: the 
argument from physiology. The latter argument is basically that the development of 
biochemistry and neurophysiology provided negative evidence against mentalism and 
vitalism; no non-physical forces were ever found. 
 
In what follows I will evaluate this argument in detail because there is much going on 
in this argument that needs to be addressed. What I will do is to point out different 
ways to respond to this argument. There are certain presumptions that I want to 
comment on, and further, I will present an objection to the validity of the argument 
itself. My claim is basically that the argument, as presented by Papineau, is 
incomplete. As will be clarified, I am stressing that the second step in his argument 
(the argument from physiology) is based on a gratuitous assumption. My objection is 
partly sustained on the basis of a plea for a sufficiently precise conception of the term 
‘physics’. If the desired goal is physicalism, it is not sufficient to show the 
reducibility of one higher level to the next lower level. (E.g., to show the reducibility 
of sociology to psychology, or psychology to biology, and so on.) What one has to do 
– again, if the desired goal is physicalism – is to show the reducibility of every level 
above physics (including biology, neurophysiology and chemistry) down to physics.  
 
Let me start with the first part of the argument – the argument from fundamental 
forces. It is not completely clear how we are to understand the term ‘force’ here. But 
first, even if we were to spell out Papineau’s understanding of this notion, there is an 
objection I want to address that is targeted at one crucial presumption in his 
discussion. Through and through Papineau makes it clear that what is at stake in his 
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argument is the claim that there are mental (or vital) forces acting on physical bodies. 
However, it seems obvious that one does not have to maintain the claim that special 
mental forces exist in order to object to Papineau’s arguments.  
 
There are two ways to do this. The first is to say that the conception of a mental 
‘force’ misses the point. Even if one maintains that there are non-reducible (causally 
efficacious) mental properties, these cannot be associated with any higher-level 
‘special force’ as such. This line of objection is connected to one’s conception of 
causation, and it is not clear why we should accept Papineau’s account of causation 
(that causation involves the transmission of forces) instead of a more modest 
conception of the ontology of causation, e.g. that causes are basic particulars 
(Davidson 2006). The second route, as indicated above, is to question the meaning of 
the term ‘force’ as he uses it. It is not completely clear why, if we take the mental 
entities in question not to amount to a kind of special force but rather as a set of 
properties, this cannot be captured (or included) by any of the fundamental forces 
existing in the natural world. Even if it were a matter of scientific fact that every 
prima facie special force reduces to a limited set of basic (physical) forces, we would 
still not have reduced mental properties to physical properties. I.e., the existence of 
(non-reducible) mental properties does not per se violate the view that there is a 
limited set of fundamental forces. 
 
In the following section I will clarify my principal objection to Papineau’s argument 
for the CCP. As I have said, it is targeted at the second step of his argument: the 
argument form physiology.  
 
During the first half of the century the catalytic role and protein 
constitution of enzymes were recognized, basic biochemical cycles 
were identified, and the structure of proteins analyzed, culminating in 
the discovery of DNA. In the same period, neurophysiological 
research mapped the body's neuronal network and analyzed the 
electrical mechanisms responsible for neuronal activity. Together, 
these developments made it difficult to go on maintaining that special 
forces operate inside living bodies. If there were such forces, they 
could be expected to display some manifestation of their presence. 
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But detailed physiological investigation failed to uncover evidence of 
anything except familiar physical forces. (Papineau 2001, p. 31) 
 
1.6 From Biology to Physics 
 
The question one should ask is how it is that evidence from biochemistry and 
neurophysiology can provide the reason to adopt physicalism. Biochemistry and 
neurophysiology, after all, are not physics. What Papineau’s argument establishes, if 
they are sound, is not that there is a sufficient physical cause for every effect, but 
rather that bodily movements have a sufficient neurophysiological/biochemical cause 
(the causal completeness of biology, CCB for short). 
 
(CEM) Bodily movements have mental causes. 
(CCB) Bodily movements have sufficient neurophysiological/biochemical causes. 
(NOD) Bodily movements are not causally overdetermined.  
 
If the desired goal is the conclusion that the physical domain is causally complete we 
need reasons to believe in yet another premise: the reducibility of neurophysiology 
and biochemistry to physics. Such a step would presumably look like the following 
argument. (The abbreviation CEB standing for ‘the causal efficaciousness of 
biology’.) 
 
(CEB) Bodily movements have neurophysiological and biochemical causes. 
(CCP) Bodily movements have sufficient physical causes. 
(NOD) Bodily movements are not causally overdetermined.  
 
The conclusion would be that neurophysiological and biochemical causes are 
physical causes. But this is where the trouble begins. Remember that the argument 
from physiology (summed up in the first premise [CEB]) is supposed to provide the 
reason to accept CCP – the second premise. So it looks like we are jumping over the 
step that would take us from, say, the second or third lowest level (the level of 
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neurophysiology and biochemistry) to the bottom level of physics. Such an argument, 
if we follow the line of Papineau’s argument, would be something like the following. 
Development in physics provides negative evidence against neurophysiological and 
biochemical properties: when scrutinising the underlying (physical) process of a 
presumed neurophysiological and biochemical cause, we fail to reveal any 
neurophysiological and biochemical properties. So, should we expect this to be the 
case? Papineau must surely think so. I believe that the only right thing to do is to turn 
to one of the sciences that deal with one of the levels in question. Later on I will 
account for a point emphasised by systems biologists. As will be clear they argue 
against this assumption of reduction by considerations from biology. 
 
If Papineau is right in that the best reason to accept the CCP is the argument from 
physiology, it looks like the latter argument of the two above is left with a question 
hanging over it: the first premise above (CEB) is what provides us with the reason for 
accepting the second premise. That is to say, one of the premises included in an 
argument with the purpose of showing the reduction of neurophysiology and 
biochemistry to physics is already assumed to be true. I maintain that an argument 
constructed with the purpose of establishing the CCP must show exactly this: the 
reducibility of neurophysiology and biochemistry to physics hence cannot make use 
of the CCP. So if we take the argument put forward by Papineau to be favourable, we 
should be recognising the fact that the argument is not complete. It would be 
complete, however, if we add one further premise or assumption: If we assume that 
all the levels belonging to the natural world (physics, chemistry and biology) are 
physical, the argument will go through. I have illustrated how such a presumption 
cannot be established if we want to make use of Papineau’s argument for the CCP.  
 
There is one point that I need to address on behalf of Papineau. His point is not so 
much to show the reducibility of every level (above physics) down to the lowest 
level, but rather to show that any dubious property can be subject to the causal 
argument. This is what he stresses in his paper A Note on the Completeness of 
‘Physics’, co-authored with Spurrett (Spurrett & Papineau 1999). This, as mentioned 
 20 
earlier, is also what Vicente (2006, p. 150) points out. Let me turn back to the 
difficulty of specifying the scope of ‘physics’. If we assign all the properties, laws 
and entities discovered by physics to the term ‘physical’, the CCP is most likely to 
come out as plain false. So the question remains: what should count as something 
physical? It is not obvious how such a question might be answered. And remember, 
this has lead many to think that, therefore, what is more important is to determine 
what should not count as something physical: what does ‘physics’ not include? One 
tempting way of answering this question is to run any dubious properties through the 
Causal Exclusion argument (Cf. Vicente). But, obviously, this would be invalid. We 
cannot to do this if the purpose is to determine what entities should count as physical 
entities in order to apply the CCP. The circularity is conspicuous. 
 
What Papineau assumes, which he has not given any sufficient arguments for, is that 
there is some bottom level of investigation that is responsible for everything that 
happens in the natural world. This is (partly) because of the incompleteness of the 
scientific practice of physics. We simply do not know enough about the physical 
world to conclude that this level of reality is responsible for everything that happens 
in the natural world. He makes use of certain presumptions that, although plausible, 
are not as well-supported by scientific research as he takes them to be.  
  
I will point to the field of systems biology regarding the question of whether or not 
this assumption of reductionism is well-founded. I will come back to this at the end of 
this section. But first, let us be clear on what, exactly, it is that Papineau is assuming. 
As we have seen he presents us with an argument that has the purpose of establishing 
the CCP. The crucial premise in this argument is that ‘bodily movements have a 
sufficient biochemical and/or neurophysiological cause’. This, in turn, is a 
generalisation by induction from the following observations: “A great deal became 
known about biochemical and neurophysiological processes, especially at the level of 
the cell, and none of it gave any evidence for the existence of special forces not found 
elsewhere in nature.” And further, “detailed physiological investigation failed to 
uncover evidence of anything except familiar forces.” (Papineau 2001, p. 31) We 
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have to bear in mind the difference between the latter (negative) observations and the 
(positive) generalisation (by induction) Papineau claims that follows from them, 
which, in turn, legitimises the CCP. The crucial part of Papineau’s argument does not 
include or, by itself, entail the unity of the natural sciences, i.e., that all the 
phenomena revealed by the natural sciences should count as something physical. 
What I am stressing is that we need to show the reducibility of biochemistry and 
neurophysiology down to physics if we want to complete the argument. So we can 
see that in order for a generalisation of this kind to take place he needs to assume that 
everything science has ever revealed should be recognised as something ‘physical’. 
This is how he can maintain the claim that evidence in biology, chemistry and 
physiology all suggest physicalism. He assumes that functions, properties, events and 
processes appearing at the level of chemistry, biology and physiology are, in some 
important sense, physical. But, again, this is where he needs an argument. 
Neurophysiology is not the same as physics; neither is biology nor chemistry. There 
are, indeed, success stories to be told of the reduction of biological phenomena to 
chemistry, and successful attempts of reducing chemistry to physics. But these stories 
are not conclusive in the sense that they can establish the CCP. This is because there 
are other stories to be told: scientific theories backed up by concrete empirical 
research data that disagrees with the crucial assumption in Papineau’s argument. It is 
worth noting that Papineau operates with a broad understanding of the term ‘physics’. 
As noted earlier, he seems to be inclined to understand the term as simply meaning 
non-mental. He “proposes that the causal argument is best developed by tying the 
meaning of ‘physics’ to whatever properties are in fact needed to account for such 
‘paradigmatic physical effects’ as movements of matter.” (Spurrett & Papineau 1999, 
p. 26) It should be clear by now that it is this understanding of the term ‘physical’ that 
my scepticism is aimed at. I think that this broad understanding is too loose if the 
desired goal is physicalism. It is quite possible to deny physicalism in other ways 
than by appealing to the caricatured dualism to which Papineau is opposed. There are 
other alternatives that are, one might claim, better supported by science than the strict 
reductionism Papineau is defending; alternatives backed up by scientific theories that 
are in direct conflict with one or more of the profound ingredients in physicalism.  
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Dennis Noble (2008) presents us with empirical data revealed by biologists that is in 
conflict with the assumption expressed above. Systems biologists, such as Noble 
among others, argue that there are, in fact, non-reducible higher-level properties with 
essentially explanatory roles. That is, properties that are essential for explaining what 
we need to explain. The idea is that are certain features (e.g. a function) emerging at 
the level of biological systems (e.g. an organ or a cell) that are responsible for the 
behaviour of its component parts (e.g. proteins or genes). The component parts of a 
biological system realizes certain systems properties – properties that cannot be 
explained by the parts alone – and these emergent properties in turn influence, and 
therefore, in an important sense cause, the behaviour of the elements at a lower level. 
(Noble 2008, chap. 4) I say this only to point out that the reductionist programme has 
its opponents. Systems biologists claim that global bottom-up causation (as expressed 
by the CCP) is simply false, in that modern scientific researchers have revealed cases 
of downward causation. I am in no position to evaluate Noble’s claims, and I say this 
only to demonstrate the difficulty with simply assuming that everything that is subject 
to the natural sciences should be counted as something physical. I wish to emphasise 
that philosophy, as such, is in no position to answer this; I think it is evident that the 
question of causal completeness of physics is not something we can solve a priori. 
Rather, it is an empirical question to be answered by science. 
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2. Cartwright’s Stance 
 
I want to dislodge a particular vision of how the world must be if the 
laws of physics are to be true, a vision of a world where all of 
physics effects are well-ordered under its laws. We begin, 
unproblematically, with the idea that there are fundamental particles 
or fields (or whatever is the best choice from some future ideal 
physics) and these have certain fundamental features. What is 
problematic is the next step, the automatic assumption that 
everything that happens to these fundamental entities must be the 
result of the interactions of these fundamental features. I offer a 
picture of a far richer world, one with a vast variety of features, most 
of which cannot be captured under concepts that could be regimented 
into systems of relations and measurement procedures that look 
anything like those of modern mathematical theories in physics and 
especially not of any one single consistent theory. These features too 
can affect even the behaviour of fundamental particles. (Cartwright 
forthcoming, p. 17) 6 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The CCP, as we have seen, plays an important role in the contemporary discussion 
about mind and nature. The doctrine is widely viewed as a well-supported and 
therefore an undeniable metaphysical thesis. The thesis, it is said, is supported by 
contemporary scientific theories in physics: we have good empirical evidence for the 
completeness of physics. The fundamental particles (or strings or fields, or whatever 
turn out to be the fundamental building blocks) together with certain basic laws (and 
maybe also mathematics and logic) are what constitute the complete domain of 
physics. The question Nancy Cartwright (forthcoming) occupies herself with is 
                                            
6 In this quote we can see that Cartwright is not bringing up the issue whether higher-level features are caused 
solely by lower-level features or not. Neither is it a question about the causal efficaciousness of higher-level 
features with respect to changes at that level. Rather, what she is questioning is whether higher-level features 
can be responsible for changes at the lowest level. This is what we know as ‘downward causation’. The first 
premise in the Causal Exclusion argument is an example of what is at stake: mental causes have physical 
effects.  
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precisely this: do we, really, have good empirical support for the claim that the 
physical domain is ontologically preeminent? Her answer, in short, is ‘no’. In what 
follows I will give an account of Cartwright’s considerations with regard to her claim 
that the level of physics is most accurately characterised as an incomplete domain. 
 
Cartwright advocates empiricism, and this concerns the justification of our 
metaphysical theories as well. What she is stressing is that we should have good 
empirical support for our metaphysical theories if we want to apply them. “We do not 
have good empirical evidence for the stronger claim [“that physics can (in principle) 
predict – and predict well – everywhere in its domain”] and without empirical 
evidence it must not play a role in science.” (Cartwright forthcoming, p. 19)  
 
Cartwright asserts a pluralistic metaphysics. She has presented many different 
arguments for this in many books and articles, and I will not account for it all. My 
primary focus will be on the content of a lecture she held in Oslo in August 2008 
entitled The Incompleteness of Physics and the Hodgepodge of Nature, 7 and on her 
paper Natural Laws and the Closure of Physics (forthcoming).8 I’ve also looked at 
her books How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), The Dappled World (1999) and 
Hunting Causes and Using Them (2007). In this way I have got to know her overall 
project better. I will also direct my attention to some parts of these works in the 
discussion that follows.    
 
Let me turn to the argument that is of present concern. Her arguments against the 
completeness of physics can be roughly summarised as the following:  
 
                                            
7 On August 28th professor Cartwright gave the Annual Lecture on the Mind in Nature 2008 in Oslo, a lecture 
organised by the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) at the University of Oslo. 
8 The main difference between the two is that in her talk she had a concluding remark about the question 
whether her considerations leave room for the mind to cause changes at the level of physics. 
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We comprehend nature as a pluralistic reality, and if we look at the supposed 
evidence for the CCP – what provides our best reason for believing in the doctrine, 
namely the empirical successes of physics – this can equally be accounted for by a 
pluralistic metaphysics.  
  
I want to suggest that we take this claim one step further and say that, physicalism – 
maintained on the basis of the CCP – is not something entailed by contemporary 
physics, precisely because the empirical observations that we take as evidence for the 
CCP can equally be accounted for by a different ontology. This is another claim than 
Cartwright’s. You will arrive at my conclusion if you add the assumption that the 
CCP-thesis is the strongest reason to accept, and the most important ingredient in, 
physicalism.  
 
2.2 The Dappled World 
 
Let me account for the pluralistic metaphysics Cartwright endorses. She is known for 
her characterisation of nature as ‘messy’, or as she often puts it: ‘the hodgepodge of 
nature’ and the ‘dappled world’. This is a pluralistic world picture where nature is 
mirrored by the different models we use to produce our best predictions, and by the 
different causal concepts used in scientific explanations. I.e., the different scientific 
branches, such as physics, biology, psychology, sociology, economics, and so on, use 
different models and different causal concepts in predicting and explaining each of 
their own phenomena. In her talk in Oslo one of her concluding remarks, which I 
think sums up her ontology quite well, was this: “There is causation from above, from 
below and from a thousand angles at the side.” What she is envisioning here is that, in 
nature, there is not only causation from the bottom level of physics and upwards. That 
is to say, physics is not responsible for every occurrence in the natural world; we also 
have downward causation – features appearing at higher levels responsible for 
occurrences at lower levels of reality.  
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We best see what nature is like when we look at our knowledge of it. 
If our best-supported theories now are probabilistic, we should not 
insist on determinism. If Russell was right that physics does not 
employ causes, we should agree with Hume, at least about the basic 
material phenomena studied by physics. Unity of science is a case in 
point. How unified is our knowledge? Look at any catalogue for a 
science or engineering school. The curriculum is divided into tiny, 
separate subjects that irk the interdisciplinist. Our knowledge of 
nature, nature as we best see it, is highly compartmentalized. Why 
think nature itself is unified? (Cartwright 1983, p. 13) 
 
In her paper Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? (Cartwright 1983, pp. 54-73) 
Cartwright discusses what she calls ‘the facticity view’. It may be summed up with 
the following question: “[do] laws of nature describe how physical systems 
behave[?]” Cartwright argues that this cannot be the case. Her argument is based on 
her view of how scientific physics works when it works as best as it can. Her view is 
that the most accurate predictions, and where we can see to be the most successful in 
physics, are inside controlled experimental environments. What Cartwright is arguing 
for is that the theories used in the models of experimental physics make use of 
physical laws that, essentially, are ceteris paribus laws, i.e., they are not universal. 
The fundamental laws do not state facts about nature but they hold true of entities and 
processes in models. A fundamental law, e.g., the law of gravitation (F = Gmm’/r2) is 
thus described this way by Richard Feynman (1967, p. 14):  
 
The Law of Gravitation is that two bodies exert a force between each 
other which varies inversely as the square of the distance between 
them, and varies directly as the result of their masses.  
 
Cartwright’s point is that when we are asked to predict where a fallen object will land 
out in nature, most often it will not suffice to state the law of gravitation. Accordingly 
the law of gravitation does not truly describe how bodies behave. This is because no 
bodies behave just as the law of gravitation says, at least not in nature. There will 
always be many different forces affecting the behaviour of the bodies. So the law of 
gravitation should most accurately be expressed with a ceteris paribus modifier in 
front: 
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If there are no forces other than gravitational forces at work, then two 
bodies exert a force between each other which varies inversely as the 
square of the distance between them, and varies directly as the result 
of their masses. (Cartwright 1982, p. 58) 
 
2.3 Plurality in Causality 
 
The pluralistic worldview we see Cartwright’s portraying is also argued for by 
considerations of causation. (Cartwright 2007, pp. 9-53) I do not want to evaluate her 
arguments in all of their details; rather what I want to do is to briefly sketch out her 
view on causation. This will help us to take hold of her claim (also quoted in the 
beginning of this section) that higher-level features can “affect … the behaviour of 
fundamental particles.” (Cartwright forthcoming, p. 17) The following quote is from 
the introduction to the first chapter in Hunting Causes and Using Them (2007, p. 9): 
 
[T]he different accounts of causality that philosophers and 
economists offer point to different features that a system of particular 
causal relations might have, where the relations themselves are more 
precisely described with thick causal terms – like ‘pushes’, 
‘wrinkles’, ‘smothers’, ‘cheers up’, or ‘attracts’ – than with the loose, 
multi-faceted concept causes. 
 
Cartwright argues for what we can label ‘causal pluralism’. This pluralism claims that 
there are many different kinds of causal laws that operate in many different ways. Her 
argument is basically that there is not one characteristic feature that all these different 
cases (of whom we call upon ‘causation’) share or have in common. Rather, the 
different kinds of causal processes are equally autonomous. The particular level of 
investigation and the underlying goal of that investigation is what fix the different 
kinds of causations. This epistemological argument is based on considerations of the 
different methods (e.g., in the social sciences) that can provide warrant for a causal 
conclusion. (See: Cartwright 2007, p. 9; pp. 24-42) 
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Causation, I argue, is a highly varied thing. What causes should be 
expected to do and how they do it – really, what causes are – can 
vary from one kind of system of causal relation to another and from 
case to case. Correlatively, so too will the methods for finding them. 
Some systems of causal relations can be regimented to fit, more or 
less well, some standard pattern or other … – perhaps we build them 
to that pattern or we are lucky that nature has done so for us. Then 
we can use the corresponding method from our tool kit for causal 
testing. Maybe some systems are idiosyncratic. They do not fit any of 
our standard patterns and we need system-specific methods to learn 
about them. The important thing is that there is no single interesting 
characterizing feature of causation; hence no off-the-shelf or one-
size-fits-all method for finding out about it, no ‘gold standard’ for 
judging causal relations. (Cartwright 2007, p. 2)  
 
What Cartwright is suggesting is a metaphysical thesis which portrays reality as 
consisting of a patchwork of laws. The idea, as she puts it, is that, in writing the Book 
of Nature, “God … writes down each and every regularity that his universe will 
display. [He then leaves to] Saint Peter … the gargantuan task of arranging the initial 
properties in the universe in some way that will allow all God’s laws to be true 
together.” (Cartwright 1999, p. 33) The metaphysical idea Cartwright is in opposition 
to is the widely accepted doctrine of (reductive) physicalism. If physicalism is true, 
what had to be done when God created (and Saint Peter arranged) the universe was to 
write down all the laws and lay down the initial positions and velocities of all the 
atoms; and then they needed to calculate all future happenings, including what, if any, 
macroscopic properties and macroscopic laws will emerge. (Ibid.) The metaphysical 
pluralism Cartwright endorses “…is the doctrine that nature is governed in different 
domains by different systems of laws not necessarily related to each other in any 
systematic or uniform way; by a patchwork of laws.” There is nothing absurd about 
this world picture. Her claim is that it is, as a matter of fact, a more credible portrayal 
of reality if we take science, and more general our experience of reality, to be the best 
guide as to see what nature is like.  
 
There is especially one thing that Cartwright discusses that, in my opinion, is the 
most crucial part in her theory of pluralism. It is about her discussion of laws and her 
evaluation of them as ceteris paribus laws. What Cartwright is stressing, as will be 
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clear in the following section, is that we have no good reason for invoking universal 
validity of the fundamental laws of physics. What she is claiming is that we have no 
empirical grounds for taking our laws as universally true, and precisely this – 
empirical evidence – is what we should demand.  
 
2.4 Two Arguments Against the CCP 
 
Let me turn back to the question as to whether the physical laws truly describe how 
bodies behave.9 The answer, according to Cartwright, is ‘no’. In nature, she points 
out, there is never just one force at work causing the behaviour of physical bodies; 
there are always multiple forces acting simultaneously. Her example of a dollar bill 
dropped from a height illustrates the point. (Cartwright 1999, p. 26-8) It will not 
suffice to state the law of gravitation if we want to predict where the floating dollar 
bill will land. This is because there are thousands of other factors affecting the fall of 
the bill, such as the wind as well as the complexity of the interaction between the 
dollar bill and air molecules. So the question is where we get our empirical data, 
which is supposed to support the claim that the fundamental physical laws are 
universally true, and that they, ultimately, constitute a complete domain responsible 
for all the occurrences in the natural world? The answer, according to Cartwright, is 
that what we have – which is what we take to be evidence for the claim that a 
physical law expresses an actual state of fact – is some experimental set-up under 
extremely controlled conditions. Her examples of experiments with superconductors 
or with lasers show us what she has in mind.  
 
There are two arguments against the CCP presented in the paper Natural Laws and 
the Closure of Physics (forthcoming). As I’ve noted above, the arguments themselves 
draw on her view of how she sees physics working when it works best: when it 
                                            
9 This, as we have seen, is what Cartwright directly asks in her paper Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? 
(1983). However, the same question is also treated, though indirectly, in the paper Natural Laws and the 
Closure of Physics (forthcoming). 
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provides accurate and precise predictions. Following this line of thought, we may say 
that there is a problem for the defenders of the CCP because the situations in which 
the fundamental laws of physics get empirical support are those when scientists 
construct experimental environments where they strive for the absence of external 
forces. That is to say, the physical entities that are subject to investigation are 
shielded off from the various forces that normally affect them. The experimental set-
ups are constructed so as to exclude causal interferences that are not subject to the 
physical concepts that are subject to, or used in, the current experiment. The external 
forces that are excluded are every force that is not studied in the particular 
experiment. What Cartwright is stressing is that when we try to find empirical support 
for our physical theories – involving giving an account of what causes are at work, 
and, generally, describing what’s going on – we make use of highly constructed 
experiments, where the biggest challenge, and what the scientists need to do, is to 
secure the absence of a huge amount of other causes – causes that normally are at 
work. The actual picture of nature is that there are a vast amount of complex 
phenomena whose behaviour is the result of multiple forces. If the fundamental 
physical laws describe facts, they only describe how things would act given the 
absence of a series of causal forces. But the correct picture is that actual processes are 
the result of a composition of many different causes. So, the laws that describe how 
physical bodies behave only describe the behaviour inside controlled environments. 
That is to say, the laws describe how a physical system behaves other things being 
equal. Her point, of course, is not that fundamental particles behave differently inside 
the laboratory and outside. Her point, rather, is that we need to recognise the 
difference between “environments that are properly structured so that the laws of 
physics can act without interferences not subsumed under proper physics concepts 
and those where the environments are more messy.” (Forthcoming, p. 15)  
 
Again, the laws of physics describe how physical systems behave when they are 
shielded from the various capacities that normally affect them. In nature we do not 
see bodies that are affected by one, and only one, force. What we have, rather, is a 
plurality of causes responsible for the changes (e.g., a movement) occurring in nature. 
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The knowledge we gain from experiments in physics tells us what can happen, not 
what will happen. (Cartwright 1999, p. 10) 
 
The second argument is established on a meta-consideration about science. She now 
turns to the concepts used in scientific explanations. In the social sciences there is a 
distinction between internal and external validity. Internal validity is when an 
experimental set-up can ensure that the result really holds in the experimental setting. 
External validity, on the other hand, is when we can presume validity of target 
situations outside the experimental setting. One way of seeking external validity is to 
‘climb up the ladder of abstraction’. If we describe the outcome of an observation in a 
more abstract way we buy greater breadth of external validity. The way we can claim 
external validity is to see the experimental result as an instance of inductive 
generalisation. Cartwright (forthcoming p. 9) advances this maxim: 
 
“We can buy greater breadth in the inductive generalization that an outcome supports, 
and hence in the external validity of the outcome, by climbing up the ladder of 
abstraction in describing that result.” 
 
But there is a well-known problem, she divulges: “[w]hat goes up must come down.” 
(Ibid. p. 10) In physics we need to translate the general and abstract terms in 
everyday life back into more concrete terms if we want them to be of any practical 
use. Physics, above all, is the exact science and therefore cannot make use of abstract 
and general concepts. They need to be precise and reliable, and they need to be 
subject to concrete measurable quantities. Hence, the physicist’s job it to climb down 
the ladder of abstraction. Cartwright notes: “These characteristics of the concepts are 
what gives physics its great powers of precise prediction.” (Ibid. p. 18) Her argument 
hereof is this: the concepts used in physics do not seem to be applicable to “the great 
bulk of causes at work in Nature, even of all the causes that can affect the 
fundamental behaviour of physics’ fundamental entities.” (Ibid.)  Importantly, she is 
not saying that there cannot be such concepts in ‘the Great Book of Nature’. What she 
is saying is that we do not have evidence in favour of the claim that there are. What 
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we have evidence for is the claim that physics predicts well within its domain where 
it can. But this, however, must not be confused with the stronger claim that physics in 
principle can predict everything within its domain. “I have said nothing that argues 
that there cannot be. But if we are going to give a credible answer – yes or no – to the 
question of the self closure of physics, ‘might’ is not enough.” (Ibid.)  
 
In questioning the CCP Cartwright has a distinct sense in which some things are 
legitimated. She insists on the need for empirical evidence with regard to the 
justification of our metaphysical claims. Many take the empirical success of science 
to be our best reason for believing in the CCP, but Cartwright disagrees. Her claim is 
that the empirical success of physics does not argue for the CCP. According to 
Cartwright what science exhibits, the body of scientific knowledge we have, is, in 
fact, the best proof there is for endorsing pluralism. So the fact that the empirical 
observations (which we take as constituting our best reason for believing in the CCP) 
can equally be accounted for by a pluralistic ontology, now turns over to be a 
sufficient proof for accepting pluralism.  
 
2.5 Cartwright and the Rest of the World 
 
It is conspicuous that in the debate about mental causation few, if any, pay attention 
to Cartwright’s work; in discussions about mind, metaphysics, science and causation 
in relation to physicalism we scarcely hear talk of Cartwright’s arguments and 
considerations. One of the main reasons for this, I believe, is not so surprising once it 
is pointed out to us. It has to do with the starting point of one’s discussion. Although 
Cartwright indeed has a lot to offer – she fruitfully contributes – to the discussion 
about mental causation and physicalism, questions concerning these are not her initial 
ones, neither is it of her primary interest, it appears to me. The questions she asks 
take a completely different route than the rest of the world. (By the inane annotation 
‘the rest of the world’, I’m referring to the community of the philosophers writing 
about these topics.) The major part of the literature is based on some accepted 
(though maybe silently accepted) assumptions, which make up the starting point, or 
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basis of the discussion. What I am thinking of here is that in the literature discussing 
mental causation one will mostly see that the starting point, and precisely what we 
have a hard time fitting the human mind into, is particle physics and the causal 
interactions between these entities (as expressed by the thesis of causal completeness 
of physics). (See e.g., Kim 2000; Papineau 2004) Most of the philosophers discussing 
the problem of mental causation strive to understand the mind’s relation to physics 
where the common understanding of ‘physics’ is the domain of the lowest level 
constituted by fundamental particles. Cartwright does it differently. When she carries 
out her discussions and advances her arguments she does so by assuming 
commonsense physical objects, as in the case of the floating dollar bill. Her starting 
point is with these objects rather than particle physics. If your starting point is with 
particle physics it seems hard to refute the larger commonsensical objects that 
Cartwright starts of with, and also, one might argue, the entities invoked in 
psychology, sociology and economics. I will come back to this; in the final section 
I’ll take up the issue concerning the question of which side of the physicalist/non-
physicalist debate we should consent to. I will focus on the foundation, or starting 
point, of one’s argumentation, and this will affirm the contrast between physicalism 
and pluralism. Finally, in the light of this, I will offer an argument for pluralism. But 
first let me turn to John Dupré and his book The Disorder of Things. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
3. Dupré’s Ontological Pluralism 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There is a widespread conception among philosophers of mind in contemporary 
discussions that some form of physicalism must be true. A general form of reasoning 
goes, I believe, like this: dualism is unacceptable, therefore physicalism. The 
Cartesian legacy is conspicuous in contemporary discussions in the philosophy of 
mind; in other words, we were left to deal with an unacceptable dualistic worldview. 
My opinion on this manner is that it is a misconception that physicalism is the only 
game in town, as in opposition to the Cartesian substance dualism. I accept the 
assumption that a substance monistic ontology must be true, but this, by itself, does 
not entail physicalism. As should be clear by now, I believe that there is a third 
picture that deserves our attention: a pluralistic ontology compatible with substance 
monism. In his book The Disorder of Things (1995), Dupré portrays a metaphysics 
that stands in clear opposition to the physicalism dominating contemporary 
discussions in philosophy of mind. Here he presents his metaphysical theory of 
ontological pluralism.  
 
The book is targeted at the idea of a unity of science. The most obvious ontology that 
does satisfy such a project, and as noted above, the prevailing position in 
contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind is physicalism. The Disorder of 
Things is divided into four main chapters where he discusses issues concerning 
natural kinds and essentialism, reductionism, deterministic and probabilistic 
causation, and finally his chapter entitled Some Consequences of Disorder. There are 
three doctrines of current interest that is systematically attacked in Dupré’s book: 
(natural kinds and) essentialism, reductionism, and also physicalism. The book is rich 
with arguments and I cannot hope to cover half of them here. What I will do, 
however, is to sketch the general outline of his metaphysics and present some the 
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arguments in favour of the ontology in question.10 
 
Dupré is sceptical to the idea of a unified science because it fails on so many levels. 
The currently prevailing ontology (physicalism) is simply not something the natural 
sciences imply. His claim is that the metaphysics he offers us is in much greater tune 
with what science tells us about nature. Let us turn to the positive upshot of his 
discussion. The doctrine he advocates, which I simply label ‘ontological pluralism’, 
can be summarised in two main claims.  
 
[P]luralism as the claim that there are many equally legitimate ways 
of dividing the world into kinds (…); and second, in opposition to 
reductionism, pluralism as the insistence on equal reality and causal 
efficacy of objects both large and small. (Dupré 1995, p. 6-7)   
 
Before I move on to consider his arguments we need to make certain clarifications. 
First, we need to see that his ontological pluralism must be understood as a 
substantive monistic ontology. He does not mean that there are many equally real 
substances out there that constitute the different things in nature. His ontological 
claim (that there are many equally legitimate ways of dividing the world into kinds) is 
entirely consistent with substantive monism. In fact, the metaphysics Dupré endorses 
is more credible together with substance monism. We need to see that the claim that 
everything is ultimately physical (physicalism) exceeds the claim that the world is 
made out of one substance. And secondly, we need to acknowledge the realism in his 
theory.  
 
Nothing I have said, either about scientific kinds or about the kinds 
of ordinary language, suggests that these kinds are in any sense 
illusory or unreal. They may typically have vague boundaries, to be 
sure, but that is a quite different matter. Hence the realism. (p. 36) 
 
                                            
10 The third chapter in The Disorder of Things about causation and determinism is not something that I am 
going to account for here. Though there may be some interesting consequences to be drawn relevant to my 
overall discussion, I’ve chosen to limit myself to the first parts of his book. 
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3.2 A Note on the Methodology 
 
In the next section I’ll give an account of Dupré’s metaphysics, but before that I want 
to make a comment on the methodology at work in The Disorder of Things. What is 
noteworthy is the role empirical observations – of both how we use (commonsense) 
language and of science – play. This is something he shares with his former colleague 
Cartwright. In arguing for his position he makes frequent use of examples from 
science that provides him with empirical support for his thesis. The book is filled 
with detailed examples and discussions from the different sciences. However, what 
he does differently than many others in the last fifty years or so is that he turns to 
biology for support rather than physics when he discusses metaphysics (ontology). 
And that, I must say, strikes me as an absolutely right thing to do. My initial problem 
– the problem of mental causation – concerns human rationality (and more generally 
the human mind), and it should be entirely appropriate to consider biology, rather 
than physics, if our problem is to understand and explain subjectivity, experientiality, 
morality, rationality, intentionality and content (linguistic meaning; semantic) and 
their relation to the natural world. Keeping the discussion as brief as possible I would 
like to indicate what an argument for this statement may look like.  
 
The argument has an inductive form. Let us state that many problems that earlier 
have been viewed as mysteries concerning us humans (and the human psyche) have, 
in fact, on a later point in history been explained in the field of biology. To highlight 
just two examples of this are the theory of evolution, which explains where we come 
from; and genetics, which explains how and why children share so many personality 
traits with their parents. Since biology may be viewed as the scientific branch to 
explain human beings as a natural being, we are, it appears to me, justified in 
expecting validity in examples from this field in relation to prevailing problems 
concerning the human mind. Having shown biology’s clear importance to the 
argument I will refrain from further elaboration. What I have said here illustrates my 
motivation of taking biology serious in discussions about ontology.  
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3.3 Promiscuous Realism 
 
There is a certain observation which Dupré draws our attention to that is crucial to his 
view: when we are classifying things in the world, we always do this within a 
context. A question, such as ‘what kind of thing is this object?’ can only be answered 
“in relation to some specification to the goal underlying the intent to classify the 
object.” (p. 5) Every classification of things (as this or that kind of object) is guided 
by the goal of a particular investigation. And ultimately, this teleological feature 
(which appears just as much in science as in common sense) is what determines how 
we divide the world into different kinds of things (objects). This does not imply that 
the different kinds we classify things into, are unreal or ‘merely descriptions’: they 
are determined by how the things are. But, importantly, which features we so to say 
‘pick out’ is determined by the goal underlying the particular investigation. Again, 
this does not, in any way, imply that the kinds (in which we classify things into) are 
fabricated. Hence realism.  
 
In opposition to conventionalism he is quite happy to recognise the fact that 
properties are something shared by objects, but what he denies is that these are 
intrinsic properties. This assertion is explained by his distinctions between the 
stronger and weaker understanding of natural kinds. He says: “there is no reason why 
the term natural kind should we wedded to essentialism….” (p. 83) Strong natural 
kind is the doctrine that natural kinds share a common essence. (p. 63) Given this 
definition of strong natural kinds, he puts forth a view on natural kinds that implies 
that the properties must be intrinsic to the members of a kind. Or in other words, a 
natural kind’s essence is a set of intrinsic properties instantiated by a member of that 
kind. The weaker reading, the view that natural kinds indeed share properties but 
these properties depends on the thing’s relation and/or context, is in fact what Dupré 
endorses. This does not imply anti-realism, hence his insistence on the naturalism and 
realism of natural kinds. His view of properties as contextual will be elucidated in the 
next few pages. 
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In arguing that there are many equally legitimate ways of dividing the world into 
kinds or things, Dupré accounts for many interesting facts in biological practice. The 
question he occupies himself with in chapter one in The Disorder of Things is how 
are we to determine what kind of things an object belongs to in the natural world. 
This discussion concerns the problem whether or not there exist such things as 
natural kinds. That is, does it exist actual groupings of things into different kinds that 
are natural, i.e. not man-made? This leads us back to the question concerning realism 
vs. anti-realism. Dupré’s ontological pluralism, as we’ve seen, is properly understood 
realism (what he calls ‘promiscuous realism’). Let me account for his argument for 
the pluralistic feature existing in both commonsense language and in science.  
 
Crucial to Dupré’s metaphysics is the observation that the ontology he endorses is 
reflected, and therefore supported, by both commonsense and scientific language. 
The claim is that there are countless ways of taxonomising the world into different 
kinds and this is reflected by the classificatory practices within the context of both 
commonsense and the different sciences. And further, his ‘promiscuous realism’ also 
insists that the different ways of dividing the world into kinds are often done in many 
different crosscutting ways. Let me bring forth Dupré’s own examples (pp. 28-29; 34) 
to illustrate this. For example, in commonsense language the term ‘lily’ is typically 
meant to refer to a certain kind of flower. However, in biological classification the 
genus Liliaceae (or simply ‘the lily family’) comprises over 120 species including 
onions and garlic. And further, a chef has a clear distinction between an onion and 
garlic even if such a distinction is not reflected in scientific taxonomy. A farmer and a 
hunter are in no doubt whether that furry, long eared, jumping animal is a hare or a 
rabbit even if the physiological differences are minimal. In short, we make different 
types of crosscutting distinctions that are useful for us when making sense of the 
world. In commonsense language sharp distinctions exist between two things (as in 
the case between onions and garlic; between a hare and a rabbit) that are not reflected 
in science. The next question one might want to ask is whether this messiness in 
ordinary language is something we can overcome if we turn to the natural sciences. In 
science, might we expect a more unified model for classifying all the things into 
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different kinds – one unified method used in determining what kinds there are? The 
answer, as I’ve insinuated, is a resounding ‘no’ according to Dupré. What Dupré does 
is that he accounts for the different ways things are classified as different kinds 
(species) in biology. “[T]he situation when we attempt to assign organisms to species 
is quite as messy as that revealed for the case of nonscientific classification.” (p. 37) 
This messiness is illustrated with the question concerning the nature and status of 
species.  
 
First, there is a major disagreement about the very ontological 
category to which species belong: are they kinds, sets, individuals, or 
what? Second, there are a number of very different accounts extant of 
what constitutes membership of a species; most fundamentally, these 
debates concern whether the members of species are connected by 
evolutionary relation or by the common possession of morphological 
or physiological features. Third, a very traditional issue is whether 
there is some essential property defining membership of a species. (p. 
38) 
 
These observations are supposed to illustrate that there is, as a matter of fact, an open 
debate regarding how to classify species. So if we expect that we can turn to scientific 
practice to get the answer to our question, we are wrong. That is to say, we will not 
get a uniform answer. What Dupré wants to establish here is that there is nothing ‘out 
there’ in support of the claim that there is one ultimately right way of dividing and 
classifying the things in the world into kinds – of ‘carving nature at the joints’.  
 
3.4 Essentialism 
 
A further issue Dupré brings forth in the first chapter of The Disorder of Things, and 
as I’ve briefly mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, is the problem of 
essentialism: do objects exhibit certain essential properties such that the properties 
determine membership of a specific kind (e.g. species)? Accordingly, essentialism is 
the view that for any specific kind of entity, there exists a set of properties of which 
every entity must possess in order to be characterised as that kind; a kind’s essence is 
a set of properties whose possession is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
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particular individual in order to belong to that kind.  
 
Dupré offers us three main arguments against essentialism. The first argument is an 
epistemological argument. Lets call this the epistemological argument against 
essentialism. It is stated as the following. “[E]ven if a kind is determined by a real 
essence, the discovery of such an essence presupposes the discovery of the kind.” (p. 
63) What he is aiming at here is that if we insist that a natural kind is determined by 
its (set of) essential properties, it seems like these properties can only be found (hence 
stated) if we know where to look, that is if we already have identified the kind. The 
only way to come around this is to claim that the examination of one particular 
individual is sufficient in order to determine to what kind it belongs. This seems 
highly unlikely, and as Dupré points out: “Only the most extreme reductionist could 
suppose that examining a particular individual would allow one to determine to what 
kind it belonged apart for the prior recognition and at least partial characterization of 
that kind.” (p. 63) Surely, it is through observations of many individuals that allow us 
to classify them as the same kind. When we are to determine the kind’s essential 
properties we must presuppose discovery of the kind. That is to say, the only possible 
way to discover such essential properties is to know what kinds the objects (entities) 
belong to. “The conclusion is that discovering kinds does not involve discovering 
essences; and so, given that there is no other way of discovering them, nothing does.” 
(p. 64)  
 
There is one objection to this argument that I want to address. And, in my opinion, it 
is an important one. It is important because it allows us to appreciate both the 
argument’s strength and its weakness. The objection I want to clarify does not show 
that anti-essentialism is false, but the complaint is that the desired conclusion (Dupré’s 
desired conclusion, that is) is not something that follows from the argument itself. The 
argument is supposed to show that essentialism (the view that objects have a set of 
essential properties such that this set determines membership of a kind) is false. 
However, there is gap that is left unfulfilled. It is a jump, which Dupré seems to think 
is legitimate, from epistemology to ontology. The argument, in short, is that the 
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discovering of the kinds does not involve discovering essences. Even if we take the 
premises to be sound it does not follow that essences do not exist. All he has shown is 
that the essence cannot be discovered prior to the discovery of the kind. The 
essentialist might say that even if the discovering of the essences is done through the 
discovering of the kinds, the essences are still real; the essences are nevertheless the 
properties determining the membership of a specific kind.11 The strength of the 
argument lays in the insistence of empiricism with regard to our metaphysical 
theories, and more generally our knowledge about nature. Dupré defends precisely 
this kind of empiricism. What the argument then illustrates is that we have no 
empirical ground for postulating essences, and empirical support is what we need. 
This point is accounted for, and elaborated on, in the third argument (see below).  
 
The second line of argument – I label this the argument from mutation – is that the 
essentialist’s account of kinds construes them as immutable and static. This is in clear 
conflict with examples from the natural sciences, e.g. the theory of evolution, which 
delineates them as mutable and dynamic. In the case of water, Dupré explains, it can 
be created (by burning hydrogen), or destroyed (by electrolysis), and properties of 
individual water can change (by getting hotter or dirtier). It is also possible that all the 
water everywhere (if it should happen that water only exists on earth) could become 
hotter or dirtier. We would not say that the kind water has changed, but rather that the 
bits of water that make it up have changed. (p. 39-40)  
 
Recall what I said about the realism in Dupré’s doctrine, and his distinction between 
strong and weak natural kinds. It is important to be clear on his position on one thing 
in particular: “I … wish to dissent from the thesis that a real essence is necessary for a 
                                            
11 There are, of course, other objections to this argument. One might generate hypothetical examples where we 
discover essences (e.g., a chemical composition, which, after all, is the best candidate of essences) prior to 
discovering a kind. Imagine for instance someone discovering a (new) kind, and that this is done by looking at 
the structure of an object’s surface. We might categorize two objects as the same kind because both are shiny 
and yellowish. Let’s say, however, that when investigating the two lumps more carefully we discover that they 
have different chemical compositions. We will thereby adjust our categorical schema and say that these two 
objects belong to two different kinds. Would it not be reasonable to say that the discovery of the second kind is 
done through the discovery of its essence? 
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natural kind.” (p. 63) This, as we have seen, is what he labels a ‘strong natural kind’. 
There is a significant difference between this claim and the view that individuals 
belonging to the same kind share properties; as I’ve noted earlier, he is more than 
happy to admit that individuals belonging to one kind share properties. Having said 
this, however, it does not entail a commitment to strong natural kinds. 
 
The identification of a strong natural kind must involve the belief 
that the behavior of its instances depends, in some important cases, 
on intrinsic properties of the individual characteristic of members of 
that kind. But it would be hard to find even the most ignorant racist 
nowadays prepared to assert that the dispositions to behavior and 
social interactions of a man raised in, say, rural Zimbabwe would 
have been just the same if that individual had been brought up in a 
wealthy Californian suburb. (p. 80) 
 
To understand this argument against essentialism – let me call this one the argument 
from empiricism – we must follow the following line of thought. The essence of a 
kind, K, can be summarised as a set of properties, say P1, P2 and P3. We will thereby 
get an answer to the question ‘to what kind do the objects that instantiates P1, P2 and 
P3 belong to?’. But this is not the only demand. “[E]ssences are also thought of as 
determining the properties and behavior of objects belonging to the kinds of which 
they are the essences.” (p. 62) That is to say, something more is required from P1, P2 
and P3 to count as the essence of K: the essence must also provide us with explanatory 
power of the properties and behaviour of members of K. As D. Gene Witmer (2003, p. 
186) explains: “The essence of water, it is commonly said, is to have the chemical 
composition H2O, and this essential feature provides the explanation of its liquidity, 
its ability to freeze, evaporate, dissolve other materials, and so on.”  Dupré’s claim is 
that there are scientific categories that lack this sort of explanatory power.  
 
The main force of the argument is a plea for complete empiricism 
with regard to the explanatory potential of particular kinds. My 
suggestion is that a commitment to real essences either is vacuous or 
violates this demand. (…) [W]hat makes a kind explanatory useful is 
that its instances share the same properties or dispositions and are 
susceptible to the same force. But since we have no way of deciding 
how much such concomitance to expect in any particular kind, the 
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discovery of a kind adds little, if anything, to the discovery of 
whatever correlations may turn out to characterize it. (…) I take the 
preceding discussion to illustrate this point in the following way: it is 
easy enough to distinguish classes at many different levels of 
generality – males, male vertebrates, men Irishmen, and so on – but 
there is nothing in this process of differentiating classes that provides 
any basis for predicting the extent to which its members will be 
amenable to lawlike generalizations. (Dupré 1995, p. 80-81)  
 
With this plea for empiricism Dupré argues against essentialism. The latter argument 
can be summarised in the following way: whether or not an explanation exists is not to 
be settled a priori. And, further, “there are many scientifically useful kinds for which 
there is no comprehensive explainer…” (Witmer 2003, p. 188) So, what we have here 
is the three arguments against essentialism. The epistemological argument, as we have 
seen, is indeed possible to respond to, and, so it may be viewed as the weakest 
argument. The last argument – the argument from empiricism – depends on whether 
or not one agrees with Dupré’s empiricism. The opponents of this line of thought are 
those philosophers who, in general, endorse conceptual analysis. This leads us to the 
argument from mutation. A standard interpretation says that a denial of this implies 
that one would advocate a pre-Darwinian worldview: a denial of the theory of 
evolution.12  
 
It is worth noting that this argument is (mainly) targeted at essentialism with respect 
to species. One possible way of responding is to say that it is not at all clear how 
conclusive this argument is towards essentialism with respect to microscopic kinds, 
such as water’s essence being H2O; gold’s essence being the element with atomic 
number 79; and so on and so forth. I do not want to elaborate any further on this 
however and the reason for this is simple: I am not sure if we need to show that 
essentialism is false in order to object to reductionism and physicalism. You do not 
have to agree with Dupré in that reductive physicalism requires, or rests on, 
essentialism. What I want to do is to suggest, in a broad outline, a way of 
                                            
12 See Okasha’s paper Darwinian Metaphysics: Species And The Question Of Essentialism (2002) for a 
discussion about the incompatibility of biological essentialism with modern Darwinian theory.  
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strengthening Dupré’s metaphysics, in such a way that does not require a denial of 
essentialism. My question is this: is ontological pluralism bound to a denial of 
essentialism? And the answer to this, as it appears to me, is negative. One of the 
arguments Dupré advances against reductionism is this: reductionism requires 
essentialism, and essentialism is false. There are, I maintain, stronger and more 
feasible ways of denying reductive physicalism – more credible objections to 
physicalism as in contrast to the reasoning Dupré displays. My point, at its simplest, 
is this: it does not matter if you either endorse or deny essentialism: ontological 
pluralism is still feasible on the basis of a neutral attitude towards essentialism.  
 
3.5 Physicalism and Reductionism 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
So far I have not tried to spell out a precise and sufficient formulation of physicalism 
and it is this which I shall turn to now. Tim Crane (1991) suggests that we should 
understand physicalism as the thesis that all God had to do to create the world we live 
in was to create all the elementary particles and all the laws governing them; the rest 
followed from these two acts. The problem with this formulation is that it does not 
really say that much. Consider the formulation counterfactually. All we are saying, 
when we say that if we remove all the physical stuff there would be nothing left, is 
that if we removed all the elementary particles (and the laws governing them) we 
would somehow also take away all the other things too. (Dupré 1995, 91-2) That is to 
say, in accepting the formulation proposed by Crane we have not shown that mental, 
biological, economical or sociological entities are physical entities (in a sense that is 
required of a monistic ontology). What we have pointed out is that these entities – 
somehow or another – also would disappear if we removed the physical stuff. It does 
not follow that all the dubious entities are only the physical entities of which they are 
composed. This formulation mirrors how I believe many philosophers think. “[The 
denial of the existence of mental substance, God, ghosts, after life, or whatever, does] 
not require any strong positive thesis of monism.” (p. 92) Or to put it another way, 
these denials of existence does not entail physicalism unless you add the assumption 
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that physicalism is the only option beside dualism. This is what I read to be a 
delusion. There are other alternatives in opposition to dualism than physicalism. 
Ontological pluralism deserves our attention.  
 
Dupré considers another formulation, which he labels ‘compositional materialism’. It 
is stated as follows: “whatever kinds of things there may be, they are all made of 
physical entities.” (p. 92) He points out that this is not a trivial formulation because it 
denies Cartesian dualism, Gods and ghosts, but the difficulty with this is that it 
excludes a lot of things whose existence seems to be undeniable. His examples are of 
political systems, the rules of chess, and irrational numbers. These he says, do not 
appear to be made out of anything at all. (Ibid.) This line of formulation, however, 
does not pose a treat to the pluralism Dupré has in mind. This is because the 
formulation does not say anything that gives ontological primacy to those things that 
make up other things; nor does it give preeminent metaphysical or scientific 
importance to what things are made of. (Ibid.) Dupré formulates the objection in an 
Aristotelian vocabulary: “why should we emphasize matter so strongly to the 
exclusion of form?” (Pp. 92-3) 
 
A third formulation, and the second version of materialism, labelled ‘reductive 
materialism’, evokes a much bolder metaphysics. Dupré formulates it in 
epistemological terms. “[E]verything that happens can be explained…in principle, in 
terms of physical entities and the laws that govern their behavior.” (p. 93) In an 
ontological vocabulary the proposal is that the physical entities (particles, processes, 
properties and functions) together with the laws governing the behaviour of the 
physical entities cause everything that happens.13 This formulation is exactly what we 
need if we want to rule our pluralism. If we combine these two ideas, what we have is 
a thesis which claims that every biological phenomena, economical phenomena, 
                                            
13 This is almost, though not exactly, what the thesis of causal completeness says. The CCP say that every 
physical occurrence has a sufficient physical cause. The claim above, on the other hand, is that every 
occurrence (i.e., either it is physical, biological, psychological, economical, sociological or whatever) has a 
sufficient physical cause.  
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psychological phenomena, sociological phenomena, and so on, are all caused by, and 
ultimately explainable, in terms of physical entities and the laws governing their 
behaviour. Let me rephrase these two formulations. The first is what Dupré labels 
‘reductive materialism’. I will call it ‘epistemological reductive physicalism’, or 
‘ERP’ for short. Let us call the second ‘ontological reductive physicalism’ or ‘ORP’ 
for short.  
 
(ERP) Everything that happens can (in principle) be explained in terms of physical 
entities and the laws that govern their behaviour. 
 
(ORP) Physical entities and the laws that govern their behaviour cause everything 
that happens.  
 
The step from the first version of physicalism (compositional materialism) to the 
second version, as formulated above, accordingly, entails that one endorses 
reductionism. If we accept Dupré’s formulation we need a strong form of 
epistemological reductionism: the biological theories (with its laws) explaining 
biological phenomena must be reduced (or reducible) to physical theories (and laws); 
the psychological theories need to be reduced (or reducible) to physical theories; and 
so on. And further, the different higher-level laws (e.g., at the level of social groups) 
need to be reduced (or reducible) to the fundamental physical laws. The general idea 
is that a higher-level theory with laws, TB, is reduced to, or by, a lower-level theory 
with laws, TA, if all the laws in TB can be logically derived from TA. If we favour the 
ontological formulation, on the other hand, we need an ontological reduction: the 
biological properties (entities, processes or functions) must be reducible to physical 
properties (entities, processes or functions). Note that one might endorse ontological 
reductive physicalism and deny epistemological reductive physicalism. Davidson is 
famous for a version of this. If we favour Dupré’s formulation (ERP), however, it is 
most feasible to assume ontological reductive physicalism. Let us state this latter 
version of physicalism as follows:  
 
 47 
(Reductive physicalism) Physical entities and the laws governing their behaviour 
causes everything that happens; and everything that happens can (in principle) be 
explained in terms of these entities and the laws governing their behaviour.  
 
3.5.2 The Arguments 
 
On pages 99-102 Dupré presents an argument for reductionism that basically is the 
same as the Causal Exclusion argument. The crucial premise is the CCP. Dupré 
considers how an assumption about causality, namely the CCP, entails reductionism, 
and he notes that this assumption “can equally well serve as an argument from the 
falsity of reductionism to the falsity of the view of causality in question.” (p. 99) 
Dupré then offers us a line of argument against reductionism and the thesis of causal 
completeness of physics that involve an inversion of the reductionist modus ponens 
(that causal completeness requires reductionism) into the antireductionist modus 
tollens (that the failure of reductionism implies the falsity of causal completeness).  
 
In part II of his book (especially pp. 107-145) Dupré launches a discussion about 
reduction in biology. What he aims to show, in short, is that the reductionist 
programme fails in biology. He considers ecology (“the study of the determinants of 
the abundance, or relative abundance, of particular kinds of organisms” [p. 108] as he 
puts it) and genetics in his discussion. Since I am no biologist, I do not pretend to be 
in any position to evaluate Dupré’s examples in any thorough way. Therefore, once 
more what I will is to simply state the fact that the reductionist programme has many 
critics. What Dupré points to is cases in biology where we have certain (higher-lever) 
theories, which fail to be reduced to lower-level theories (e.g., that classical 
transmission genetics is irreducible to molecular genetics).  
 
To put it at its simplest, the general failure of reductionism may be 
attributed to the following fact: the individuals that would have to be 
assumed for the derivation of the macrotheory cannot be identified 
with those that are the subject of descriptive accounts at the next-
lower level, although their relationship may be close enough to allow 
such derivations to serve important explanatory purposes. The 
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possibility of this nonidentity is to be explained by the fact that the 
individuals at both levels are idealizations. Both models at the 
macrolevel and descriptive accounts or laws at the microlevel involve 
abstractions. But the abstractions involved are not the same. In 
relation to my argument in Part I, this point can be seen as 
establishing the possibility of autonomy for higher-level natural 
kinds. (p. 116) 
 
I also would like to mention Noble again here. Recall that what he aims to show is 
that there are emergent properties appearing at the level of a biological system (e.g. a 
cell or an organ) with fundamental explanatory roles with respect to the behaviour of 
the system’s component parts, not possible to reduce to these underlying components. 
(Noble 2008, chap. 4)  
 
There is an objection to Dupré’s argument (that the failure of reductionism implies 
the falsity of causal completeness) proposed by Sandra Mitchell (2003) that I want to 
briefly address. The problem with Dupré’s argument, as she sees it, is that when he 
argues for the failure of reduction in biology he does not show that reductionism fails 
in principle (which is, it seems to me, exactly what Noble aims for), but rather that 
reduction is unavailable in fact in these cases that he is considering. Recall that the 
principle of CCP claims that every physical effect (that has a sufficient cause) has a 
sufficient physical cause, and from this it does not follow that we are in a position to 
in fact explain every physical event in terms of prior physical histories, only that it 
would be possible in principle. So if the modus tollens reasoning where to go carry 
through, Dupré need to show that reduction in biology and psychology fails in 
principle. Mitchell notes that “[i]t is the … stronger claim that is needed to overturn 
causal completeness, for it is in principle reduction that figures as the conclusion of 
the reductionist argument.” (Mitchell 2003, p. 184) 
 
The question that arises, if we are to take Mitchell’s objection at face value, is what 
exactly is needed in order to show that in principle reduction fails? One might claim 
that Noble’s point, if we accept it to be veracious, is sufficient. If we can find 
causally relevant properties (with fundamentally explanatory roles, that is) at the level 
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of a biological system that cannot be explained by the component parts alone, we 
have shown in principle reduction to fall short. 
 
Let me summarise. Dupré has a distinct way of understanding (what I simply call) 
physicalism. The type of physicalism that holds Dupré’s interest is the kind expressed 
above as ‘reductive physicalism’ (you can prefer the epistemological formulation or 
the ontological one). There is another version of physicalism, however, that is fairly 
innocuous. If by ‘physicalism’ you simply mean what Dupré labels ‘compositional 
materialism’, what we have is a relatively modest statement about the world, which 
poses no threat to the pluralism Dupré has in mind.14 What we need in order to rule 
out this ontological pluralism is something much bolder: we need reductive 
physicalism – an ontology which presumes the CCP-thesis to be true. It is only by 
assuming that the physical domain is causally complete that one might hope to arrive 
at the version of physicalism that is interesting. Dupré then argues against this 
metaphysical thesis the following way: causal completeness of the physical domain 
(CCP) requires reductionism, and the failure of reductionism implies the falsity of the 
CCP, hence the falsity of physicalism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
14 I want to refer to Barry Loewer’s article From Physics to Physicalism (2001) for a thoroughgoing discussion 
concerning the question of a sufficient formulation of physicalism. In this paper Loewer discusses how we 
should understand physicalism and what does not follow from such a formulation. Noteworthy is that, given 
what he considers to be a sufficient definition, Loewer argues that reductionism and eliminativism do not 
follow. An immediate reaction to this would be to say that the formulation Loewer proposes does not rule out 
the ontological pluralism that is of current interest. Although I find Loewer’s paper interesting and worth 
reviewing I do not have room for further elaboration and will say no more about it here.  
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4. Conclusion 
4.1 Summing Up 
 
In the beginning of this dissertation I started out by sketching the problem of mental 
causation. This is a problem that is subordinate to the general problem of the relation 
between the mind and the body. Many, including me, seem to think of mind/body 
causation as the biggest puzzle and the main problem we need to solve (or dissolve) 
in understanding the mind and its place in the natural world. Although some aspects 
of the metaphysical theories I have discussed here indicate how an answer to the 
problem of mental causation could look like, I have neither tried to give an answer to 
the mind-body problem in general nor to the problem of mental causation. That has 
not been my aim. What I have done, rather, is that I have started off by focusing on 
the metaphysical theory dominating contemporary discussions on this matter. I have 
stated the argument that, in my opinion, is the most powerful argument in favour of 
physicalism. My discussion has mainly revolved around one of the three constituting 
premises. What I’ve done, accordingly, is that I’ve carried out a discussion of this 
clinching premise in an argument in favour of a metaphysical position that may have 
the capacity of formulating an answer to the mind/body problem (and mind/body 
causation).  
 
It is beyond doubt that many philosophers take the principle of causal completeness 
for granted. It is so intuitive that it is tempting to think of it as undisputable. What I 
have done is to question this principle. I’ve done this in two different ways. First, I 
have presented Papineau’s argument for the CCP and I then criticised it. My aim has 
been to show that the argument is incomplete. There are certain assumptions that 
need to be settled if we regard Papineau’s reasoning as the most preferable. Most 
striking is the assumption made regarding the question of what should be regarded as 
something physical. I have pointed out how this easily might lead to a circular mode 
of reasoning. Papineau’s argument is targeted at an exaggerated dualism that is of 
little interest. I share the opinion that the dualism we have inherited is unacceptable; 
what I do not believe however is that physicalism is the only serious alternative. It 
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seems to me that the argument advanced by Papineau is an argument against dualism, 
rather than for the CCP. The only way the argument would go through, without 
further arguments or premises, is to assume that physicalism is the only serious 
alternative to dualism.  
 
In part two and three I have focused on an alternative to physicalism. I have sketched 
an ontology, as presented by Cartwright and Dupré, that stands in clear opposition to 
the physicalism that dominates contemporary discussion about the mind’s nature. My 
aim has been to sketch out ontological pluralism in its general form. This has led me 
to the second approach of a denial of the CCP. Cartwright’s portrayal of nature and 
her arguments for it does not only show that science (and commonsense) is leaving 
room for denying the CCP, it also provides us with reasons to doubt it. Or so she 
argues.  
 
Another one of my goals has been to show that the metaphysical portrayal of nature 
called ontological pluralism is, indeed, in great tune with science. I thereby distance 
myself from Putnam’s claim that physicalism (or materialism as he prefers to call it) 
is to be regarded as ‘the scientific metaphysics’. “The appeal of materialism lies 
precisely in this, in its claim to be natural metaphysics, metaphysics within the 
bounds of science.” (Putnam 1982, p. 147)   
 
[A] good deal of our knowledge…is not of laws but on natures. 
These tell us what can happen, not what will happen, and the step 
from possibility to actuality is a hypothesis to be tested or a bet to be 
hedged, not a conclusion to be credited because of its scientific 
lineage. The point is that the claims to knowledge we can defend by 
our impressive scientific successes do not argue for a unified world 
of universal order, but rather for a dappled world of mottled objects. 
(Cartwright 1999, p. 10) 
 
Of course, the following question remains: how are mental properties causing 
changes at the lowest level? In answering this question I think the wisest thing is to 
await future science for the answer. There surly is also a lot philosophical work to be 
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done, especially in the field of philosophy of action. But the problem is not to be 
solved by philosophers alone. How could it?  
 
4.2 Balancing Pluralism and Physicalism 
 
In this final section I want to say something about Cartwright’s and Dupré’s 
metaphysical considerations and compare them to the metaphysics dominating 
contemporary discussions about mind and nature. Specifically, I will flesh out how I 
believe many physicalist conclusions come about in comparison to the pluralistic 
ontology in question. Moreover, I aim to say something about how philosophers 
conduct metaphysics. My claim, generally, is that the two opposites start off with 
certain assumptions (as one always will have to do) that differ remarkably and from 
these arise arguments that yield radically different conclusions. In my discussion I 
have focused on one of those assumptions, namely the causal completeness of the 
physical domain. This is an assumption about causation that is deeply rooted in 
philosophers’ way of thinking the last fifty years or so. There are, I believe, certain 
intuitions about nature that motivates this belief. The intuitions, more specifically, are 
that nature is a fundamentally elegant thing characterised by order, unity and 
simplicity. These intuitions are demonstrated by the physicists’ drive for the 
discovery of a theory of everything. Both Dupré and Cartwright dispute the portrayal 
of nature as elegant and ordered. Cartwright claims that the available empirical 
evidence suggests a picture of nature as rather messy. Recall Cartwright’s point 
(quoted earlier) that if we look at our knowledge of nature we will see that it is highly 
compartmentalised: divided into separate branches. And she asks, “Why think nature 
itself is unified?” (Cartwright 1983, p. 13) Quantum mechanics is another example of 
science providing us with reason to dispute the characterisation of nature as well-
ordered and simple.  
 
“…I want to consider what image of the material world is most consistent with our 
experience of it, including our impressive successes at understanding, predicting and 
manipulating it…” (Cartwright 1999, p. 9) 
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Let me start with a brief survey of Cartwright and Dupré. Like Aristotle, Cartwright 
starts of with a pluralistic ontology. Medium sized dry objects, such as chairs, tables, 
rocks, balloons, cars, coins, marbles, and what have you, are what Cartwright takes at 
face value. Cartwright’s interest is in explaining what happens to these kinds of 
objects. By presuming these kinds of things we can see what serves as the foundation 
for her metaphysical considerations. What she is finally going to end up with is a 
pluralistic view on causation. All her arguments can be seen as the attempt to 
establish the validity of the step from a pluralistic ontology to pluralism in causation. 
In the history of philosophy we see great resistance against using this pluralistic 
ontology as one’s starting point. We are not justified in this starting point, the 
objection goes; rather, we should dive into the micro world of the fundamental 
building blocks and see where it goes from there. The idea is that we should resist 
taking the objects suggested by commonsense (or more generally psychological) 
experience at face value.  
 
Dupré takes a slightly different approach. He bases his discussion on the empirical 
fact that there are many different kinds of scientific (and commonsensical) 
explanations. Recall the Aristotelian view that Dupré advocates: every classification 
of the things in the world is guided by (partly determined by, I would say) the 
underlying goal of the particular investigations. The result is an explanatory 
pluralism that serves as Dupré’s starting point. His arguments, accordingly, can be 
viewed as the attempt to establish the validity of the step from explanatory pluralism 
to ontological pluralism.  
 
It is no surprise that Dupré’s ontology and Cartwright’s view on causation coincide 
neatly. If we take Dupré’s argument to be sound we are left with an ontological 
pluralism. This ontology, in turn, can thereof be viewed as a well-founded starting 
point for Cartwright. If the arguments offered by Cartwright are considered to be 
sound, we are left with a denial of doctrine of causal completeness of the physical 
domain. I want to restate a quote from earlier to account for the contrasting portrayal 
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of nature that Cartwright asserts, which she calls ‘metaphysical nomological 
pluralism’. [It] is the doctrine that nature is governed in different domains by 
different systems of laws not necessarily related to each other in any systematic or 
uniform way; by a patchwork of laws.” (Cartwright 1999, p. 31)  
 
Most of the other contemporary philosophers involving themselves with philosophy 
of mind (what I earlier referred to as ‘the rest of the world’) have an approach that 
differs radically. I have noted earlier that their starting point is to understand mental 
causation in relation to particle physics and the causal interaction between these 
fundamental building blocks. What is notable is that this starting point consists in an 
assumption of causal monism. I.e., causation is something that holds true among 
entities at the lowest level. The Causal Exclusion argument illustrates the attempt to 
establish explanatory and/or ontological monism. The step, thereof, is from causal 
monism to explanatory and/or ontological monism. It is striking how many 
philosophers participating in the debate about mind and physicalism that use this 
monistic understanding of causation as their starting point. This particular assumption 
about causation is often taken as a fundamental metaphysical truth; this, I venture to 
claim, is the central core of the physicalism they promote. No wonder they have a 
hard time fitting the mind into their metaphysical portrayal of reality. Again, these 
physicalists’ arguments can be viewed as the attempt to fill in the gap between 
monistic causation on the one hand and ontological, and ultimately explanatory, 
monism on the other. The discussion is seldom targeted at the physicalists’ central 
idea – the causal completeness of physics. The idea is that causation is something that 
holds true between elementary physical particles; this is what causation ‘really is’. 
Every other phenomena we describe and pose explanations for, of which we employ 
causal terms (e.g. when use of words like ‘because’) is either to be reduced to the 
lowest level (presumably through the several intermediate levels), or it is only ‘a 
matter of speaking’, or to put it in a more appealing way: ‘only description’. I’d like 
to mention Davidson again at this point. He operated with such an understanding of 
causation and explanation. He understands causation as something that requires strict 
exceptionless laws and this is what relates events together. An event may be 
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described in different ways; and this choice of vocabulary determines if an event is to 
be characterised as a physical or mental one. An event may be described in two (or 
more?) different ways (by using different kinds of vocabularies, that is), but it is, 
however, a case of token-identity.  
 
In the literature one will see a reoccurring unwillingness to question the CCP; this 
monistic assumption about causation is to a big extent accepted as an unquestionable 
truth. It is not that premise that is subject to a denial in the Causal Exclusion 
argument. Rather, it must be a subtle defect in either the first premise (the causal 
efficaciousness of the mental) or of the last one about overdetermination. 
 
What is noteworthy concerning the metaphysical considerations preformed by Dupré 
and Cartwright is their insistence for empirical support when it comes to forming a 
metaphysical picture of reality. For Cartwright and Dupré, however, the notion of 
‘empirical support’ has a specific meaning; the concept is semantically conditioned. 
The opponents will have a different understanding of what it is for a (metaphysical) 
theory to have empirical support. In short, I believe that the various conceptions of 
these words are conditioned by the different foundation with which one starts. The 
point is illustrated by the following idea: different frameworks shape different 
conceptions. Cartwright’s starting point and her claim for it to be empirically 
supported, is indeed disputed. The objection is that we should not consent to the 
objects suggested by commonsense experience.15 Our ontology should rather be 
rooted in science, and what is more reliable than the natural sciences and ultimately 
physics? If our question is ‘what kind of things are there?’ we ought to turn to particle 
physics for our answer, at least as a first approximation. The best way to do 
metaphysics is to start off with the objects suggested by particle physics (together 
with the concepts and laws used there) when forming a metaphysical theory of 
ontology. So, we can see the difference does not lie in their claim for the metaphysics 
                                            
15 One line of objection can lead onto problems regarding vagueness, which is a much-debated issue. I, 
however, will not go further into this. 
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to be empirically supported or not, but rather what should count as empirical support. 
The physicalists promote the view that the larger object’s compositional parts, as 
confirmed by particle physics, have ontological primacy over the larger object itself. 
The medium sized objects are too fuzzy and vague to be taken at face value. 
Cartwright and Dupré, however, think that the preeminent importance given to 
particle physics is unjustified. We ought to take the explanatory models used by the 
other sciences into account as well. The reasoning preformed by Cartwright and 
Dupré, as we’ve seen, goes roughly like this: if the goal is to shape a metaphysical 
theory that resembles reality what could be more appropriate than to turn to science, 
or more generally, to our experience of it? Here we can see that Cartwright and Dupré 
do not allow particle physics to be superior or preeminent over the other sciences. 
Dupré finds support in biology and Cartwright mostly in economy and physics (the 
latter by an endorsement to middle sized dry objects). And further, they consider 
commonsense experience together with, or I should say backed up by, the body of all 
the different kinds of scientific explanations as a crucial guide to see what nature is 
really like. Following this through, what the metaphysician ought to do, and what 
both Dupré and Cartwright aim for, is to be well informed about up-to-date scientific 
research, methods and explanatory practices. They start off with an account of how 
we experience reality and how nature is represented by science (or by the sciences, 
we should say). Given that a metaphysical theory is meant to depict reality we’d 
better not neglect the empirical knowledge we have gained from it, including the 
fields of chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and economy (among others). 
The lesson to be learned is that our experience of reality (including the sciences’ 
representation of it) is, after all, our best guide to see what the world is like.  
 
Following this thought, it may be argued that Dupré and Cartwright have the 
advantage of enjoying the virtue of being well informed by up-to-date scientific 
methods and explanatory practice. But as we’ve seen, however, this idea – that we 
ought to be well informed by science – is not something the physicalists oppose. The 
disagreement is rather about what should count as legitimate empirical support. The 
fact that there is a plurality of different kinds of scientific explanations, 
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representations and so on, and that commonsense language depicts reality as 
pluralistic, does not provide us with reasons to endorse ontological pluralism, the 
objection goes. They are not justified in their starting point. The things they presume 
to be true are indeed commonsensical, but that does not make them true. The 
response to this objection, on behalf of the pluralists, should now be obvious. The 
foundations that Cartwright and Dupré pose are more justified than the physicalists’. 
Unlike the pluralists’, the assumption about causation that the physicalists propose 
are controversial in the sense that the claim is in lack of empirical support. The 
plurality of scientific explanations and representations, and the pluralistic ontology 
captured by commonsense experience is undeniable. Cartwright and Dupré argue for 
taking the step from this over to metaphysical pluralism and pluralism in causation. In 
their defence, the claim is that their starting point is not in lack of empirical support 
the same way the assumption about causal completeness is.  
 
In short, the disagreement is about what qualifies as ‘empirical support’. Cartwright 
and Dupré take the total body of scientific practice (that is, not only physics, but also 
biology, psychology, sociology and economy) into account and argue that the 
medium sized objects described by commonsense – the entities of which we predict 
and explain – should be taken at face value. If we do this, we’ll have a scientifically 
founded metaphysics. The physicalists, on the other hand, will not admit these kinds 
of objects to be justified ontological entities, simply because these entities are not 
suggested by science. The desired exactness is found in the science of the lowest 
level and this is where our metaphysical portrayal should be rooted. If this is done, 
the reasoning goes, we’ll have a ‘scientific metaphysics’.  
 
In the absence of a neutral ground for evaluating and balancing these two starting 
points up against each the following question arises: is it a matter of pick and choose 
which side you approve? In one sense I believe this to be the case. But then we must 
ask ourselves if there is anything apart from the very different starting points that 
would allow us to judge one or the other as more entitled or justified; something that 
provides us with reasons for judging which is better. In other words, perhaps the 
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theory’s fruitfulness outside its own domain can help to determine how far the 
interest for one or the other should go.  
 
Let me finally draw your attention back to the philosophy of mind. The problem is 
how to understand the mind and its features in relation to the natural world. As we 
have seen, the physicalists have an exclusion problem regarding the mind. My view is 
that this problem is due to the specific assumption about causality. The insistent 
worry is that there is no room for the mind to do any causal work in the world. This is 
the main problem for physicalism. The pluralists, on the other hand, do not have that 
kind of problem. A brand new world opens once you notice that the CCP is 
disputable. Suddenly there is no difficulty finding room for minds in the natural 
world, because the alternative picture is of a world consisting of many different kinds 
of things, including minds. And further, this is a world governed by a patchwork of 
laws; there is causation from below, above and a thousand angles to the side. The last 
thing I want to do is to suggest that this may be turned into an argument for pluralism. 
Despite the absence of a neutral ground for evaluating which of the starting points 
(leading to the two opposites) is more justified, we might use a kind of abductive 
reasoning: an inference to the best explanation. If our interest is in the philosophy of 
mind and mental causation, we might ask which of the two ontological portrayals 
offer us a world picture where minds are not excluded.  
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